Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2000

Ellen Hays v. Fidelity Industrial Credit Company
and North American Life and Casualty Company :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Pete N. Vlahos; Vlahos and Knowlton; Attorney for Appellant .
Carl T. Smith; Donald J. Little; Allen H. Tibbals; Attorneys for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Hays v. Fidelity Industrial Credit Company, No. 14195.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/196

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

4

*

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY

STATE OF UTAH
—000O000-—

ELLEN HAYS,

SEP 1 6 1976

)

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
J. Reuben Clark Law School

)
)

vs.
)

FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT
COMPANY OF OGDEN and
NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY, an
Insurance Corporation,

)
)

Case No. 14195

)

Defendants and
Respondents.

)
—000O000-—

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY

Appeal from the Judgment of the Second
Judicial District Court for Weber County,
Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge
PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ.
VLAHOS & KNOWLTON
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Appellant .

ALLEN H. TIBBALS
220 South Second East - Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent,
North American L i f e and Casualty C

CARL T. SMITH, ESQ., and
DONALD J. LITTLE, ESQ.
520 - 26th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorneys for Respondent,
Fidelity Industrial Credit Company of Ogden
Tj

n

n

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

1
.

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

4

POINT I
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT ADEQUATE DISCOVERY WAS DENIED
WAS NOT PRESENTED TO THE LOWER COURT, IS WITHOUT MERIT AND CANNOT
SERVE AS A BASIS FOR REVERSAL OF THE COURT BELOW
POINT II
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS NO ENFORCEABLE
THE DEFENDANT, NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND
SURRENDERED BY THE OWNER-INSURED PRIOR
DER VALUE AS A NON-FORFEITABLE BENEFIT
CONCLUSION

4

CLAIM TO DEATH BENEFITS AGAINST
CASUALTY COMPANY UNDER THE POLICY
TO HIS DEATH FOR THE CASH SURRENUNDER THE POLICY
8
20

1

CASES CITED
PAGE
1. Bicknell v. Jones, 203 Kan. 196 - 453 P.2d 127

8

2. Claasen vs. Farmer's Grain Cooperative, 208 Kan. 129, 490 P.2d 376......

8

3. Decker vs. New York Life Insurance Company, 94 Utah 166; 76 P.2d 568

14

4. Decker vs. New York Life Insurance Company, 97 Utah 453; 93 P.2d 689

18

5. Pacific States Life Insurance Company vs. Bryce, 67 Fed. 2d 710

13

6. Pack vs. Progressive Life Insurance Company, 187 SW 2d 501

11

" j

TEXTS

'..:./. ':V,;V

1. 15 A.L.R. 3rd; At Page 1317.:.

18

2. Couch on Insurance, 2d. Ed., §32:183

10

STATUTES
1. 31-22-13 U.C.A. 1953 as Amended

19

1i

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH
—000O000—

ELLEN HAYS,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14195

FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT
COMPANY OF OGDEN and
NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY, an
Insurance Corporation,
Defendants and
Respondents.
—000O000—

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
This action was brought by ELLEN HAYS, Plaintiff-Appellant to recover
as Beneficiary on a policy of life insurance on the life of her husband even
though immediately prior to his death the policy had been surrendered by him as
owner-insured for the cash values therein.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On Motion of Respondent, NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY for
Summary Judgment based on admitted and uncontested facts, the Court as a matter
of law dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint (R.154-5).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY seeks the affirmance of the Judgment granted by the District Court.

- 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent, NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY considers the
statement of facts contained in Appellant's Brief to be inaccurate, incomplete and
inadequate and therefore elects to set forth the facts necessary to consideration
of this case on appeal by this Court.
MARVIN E. HAYS, was the husband of ELLEN HAYS, Plaintiff-Appellant herein
(R. 4 ) . By Application No. 265971 bearing date of April 9, 1965, MARVIN E. HAYS,
at Ogden, Utah, applied to NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY through its agent,
GAIL L. SALTUS, for the issuance of a policy of life insurance (R. 105 and 106). On
the 8th day of July, 1965, NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY issued Policy
No. L-939534 to MARVIN E. HAYS, who was then of the age of 45 years (R. 105). The
initial sum of insurance or face value of the policy as of the date of issuance was
$5,000.00 (R. 105). Certain other benefits were also applied for in connection with
the policy (R. 105 and 106). Premiums were paid and the policy was continued in full
force and effect, to just prior to March 21, 1972, when an inquiry was initiated by
MARVIN E. HAYS through RON JENSEN of FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN to
NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY as to adjusted cash value in the policy of
life insurance hereinabove referred to (R. 99, 102 and 110). The company replied to
HAYS in care of RON JENSEN, advising that the cash value was $283.13.

The letter

advising of the cash value stated,
"We are enclosing Surrender Forms but urge that you consider the suggestions on the reverse side of the form before proceeding with the surrender of your insurance" (R. 102).
On the reverse side of the Application for Surrender are set forth seven suggestions
urging the insured not to relinquish his insurance but to use other methods to raise
funds and protect his insurance (R. 103). The policy of insurance carried this expres:
provision,
"The insured shall be the owner of this policy, unless
otherwise provided. With the exception of the benefit payable
at the death of the insured to the Beneficiary, the owner, subject to the rights of any assignee, shall have all rights, privileges and benefits contained in this policy." (R. 23, Interrogatory No. 2, policy attached).

- 3 There was no provision of the policy which limited MR. HAYS' rights as ownerInsured. One of the "non-forfeiture benefits" of the policy was the right of
the owner to surrender the policy at any time for its cash surrender value
(R. 23, policy attached). Despite the admonition contained in the letter from
the company under date of March 21, 1972 (R. 102), MARVIN E. HAYS elected to
file with the company, a surrender of the policy for its cash value (R. 104).
This surrender was duly signed at Ogden, Utah, according to its terms, on March
24, 1972, and was witnessed by one RON JENSEN (R. 104). Plaintiff-Appellant
admits that this action was taken by the insured as owner of the policy on March
24, 1972 at approximately twelve o'clock noon (R. 99). Plaintiff further admits
that thereafter and prior to his death, MARVIN E. HAYS did nothing to rescind
the action which he had taken (R. 89, No. 5 ) . The Application for the cash surrender value of the policy was put out of the control of the applicant and forwarded
by mail to the insurance company by regular mail, March 24, 1972 (R. 75, No. 19).
The insurance company received the Application for cash surrender value at its
headquarters in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on March 27, 1972 (R. 51, No's. 16F and 6
and 17). The Application was processed immediately and a check issued March 28,
1972 (R. 16G, R. 112). On March 27, 1972, at approximately 10:30 A.M., the insured
MARVIN E. HAYS, died at St. Benedicts Hospital in Ogden, Weber County, Utah (R. 100
The check in the amount of $283.13 for the cash value of the policy was taken by
the Plaintiff-Appellant herein and cashed (R. 89, R. 100). Though immaterial to
the decision of the case, Plaintiff claims to have given notice to FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN, at about noon on March 27, 1972, of the death of
MARVIN E. HAYS, the insured (R. 99, 100). RON JENSEN of FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT
COMPANY OF OGDEN claims to have notified the Respondent insurance company at its
home office by telephone on the same date, March 27, 1972, at an unknown hour, of

- 4 the death of MARVIN E. HAYS (R. 75). The insurance company has been unable to
locate any record of receipt of any such telephone call (R. 53, No. 26). Some
three months after the Plaintiff had received and cashed the check of NORTH
AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY for the cash surrender value of the policy
issued to the insured, the Plaintiff retained the services of MR. VLAHOS to
attempt to recover the face value of the insurance policy (R. 100, 101). Action
was initially commenced by the Plaintiff as Administratrix of the Estate of MARVIN
E. HAYS, by the filing of a Complaint in that capacity in the District Court of
Weber County, State of Utah, dated the 17th day of December, 1972, and filed
December 20, 1972 (R. 1-3). Ultimately the Complaint was amended to set forth the
claim on behalf of the Plaintiff-Appellant as the Beneficiary of the policy of
insurance (R. 60-62).
lawsuit (R. 60-63).

It is in this capacity that Plaintiff proceeded with the
The foregoing are essential facts. Additional facts necessary

to the consideration of the Plaintiff's claim of lack of opportunity for discovery
will be set forth as needed in the argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT ADEQUATE DISCOVERY
WAS DENIED WAS NOT PRESENTED TO THE LOWER COURT, IS WITHOUT
MERIT AND CANNOT SERVE AS A BASIS FOR REVERSAL OF THE COURT BELOW
Even a cursory examination of the record discloses the lack of validity
to the claim asserted at this date by Plaintiff-Appellant that she was denied her
right of adequate discovery.

The case was pending from December 20, 1972 (R. 1)

until its ultimate decision by the HONORABLE JOHN F. WALQUIST by memorandum decision made and entered the 30th day of June, 1975, a space of two and one-half years
in which Plaintiff-Appellant made no effort at the discovery which Appellant now
claims was denied to it.

Despite the fact that the relationship of NORTH AMERICAN

LIFE AND CASUALTY and FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN is totally immate

-

5

-

rial to the decision of the Court in this matter, as will be more fully shown in
the discussion of the merits of this cause under POINT II of this Brief, neither
NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY nor FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY
OF OGDEN have failed to respond appropriately as determined by the lower Court
to the discovery directed to either NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY or
to FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN (R. 22-34, 43, 44, 46-55, 74,75).
At pages 5 and 6 of the Appellant's Brief, Appellant implies that the NORTH AMERICAI
LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY had refused to furnish the details of the insurance polii
issued by that company upon the life of MARVIN E. HAYS. The Appellant states that
"the Respondent attached an insurance form in blank
without setting forth therein any of the information contained
in the original policy and without any of the items of specificity desired by the Appellant, such as the amount of the
policy, provisions for additional benefits, the named Beneficiary, the name of the agent or agents subscribing to the
policy of insurance".
Appellant neglects to advise the Court that in Open Court on the occasion of the
appearance before the HONORABLE RONALD 0. HYDE, JUDGE, on the 3rd day of July, 1973
on the Defendant NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY'S objections to the Inter
rogatories of the Plaintiff, Defendant-Respondent's attorney presented to the
attorney for the Plaintiff the details requested in the form of a reproduced copy o
the actual application and of the face of the actual policy. That the details of
the policy requested by Plaintiff were furnished to the Plaintiff is admitted in
the Motion and Notice to Amend Complaint filed by MR. VLAHOS on behalf of his clienl
under date of December 11, 1973, wherein he states:"Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint herein and
following discovery of the terms of the insurance policy, the
Plaintiff believes that the real party in interest is Ellen
Hays individually instead of as Administratrix of the Estate "
of Marvin E. Hays, and therefore, desires to file an Amended
Complaint to show the proper party in interest herein.
This Motion is based upon the pleadings, papers, records,
and files In this action". (R. 63) (Emphasis ours)

- 6These details were again supplied in the Respondent's narrative statement of facts
dated January 17, 1975, and filed by the Court January 23, 1975 (R. 105-107). In
view of the fact that the matter of the Plaintiff's Interrogatories and the objections thereto by the Defendant-Respondent, NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,
were ruled upon by the Court, it would seem that if Plaintiff claimed any error
by the Court in the ruling so made, an appeal should be prosecuted from the decision
of the Court made and entered by the HONORABLE RONALD 0. HYDE on July 12, 1973
(R. 43,44).

No such appeal has been taken nordoes Plaintiff-Appellant designate

any part of this appellate procedure as having been taken from that ruling. It
should also be noted that amended answers to the Interrogatories of Plaintiff were
filed setting forth all of the information ordered by the Court, under oath, served
on Plaintiff by mail October 16, 1973 and filed October 17, 1973 (R. 46-54). No
exception was noted, no objections were made by the Plaintiff-Appellant personally
to counsel or formally with the Court to the answers of Defendant.

No further

Interrogatories or demands were made or directed to Defendant, NORTH AMERICAN
LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, nor were any deficiencies in the response pointed out
in either further pleadings by Plaintiff or otherwise until the filing of the
Appellant's Brief in this action.

Under date of January 10, 1975, attorney for the

Plaintiff-Appellant set forth in a communication directed to the HONORABLE JOHN
F. WALQUIST to ALLEN H. TIBBALS and to CARL T. SMITH as counsel for the respective
Respondents, a statement that:
"however depositions are going to be set in connection
with the one employee at Fidelity Industrial Credit of Ogden
and also Mr. Gail T. Saltus of Salt Lake City, Utah". (R. 99101 at 101)
*

.

•

'

,

•

•

•

'
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•
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Initially by telephone to PETE VLAHOS, confirmed by letter dated January 8, 1975
to both VLAHOS and CARL T. SMITH and ultimately included in the narrative statement
of facts supplied by NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY in compliance with

- 7 the Order of the Court and mailed as shown by the mailing certificate attached
thereto to the attorney for the Plaintiff-Appellant, the full name and address
of GAIL L. SALTUS was set forth where he could be reached both as to his residence
and as to his business at that date (R. 105-108 at 106). After the filing of
the narrative statements above referred to, Respondent waited for an additional
four months before petitioning the Court for a Summary Judgment in the matter. No
Depositions were ever scheduled by Plaintiff. The Motion for Summary Judgment was
duly served upon the attorney for the Plaintiff by mail on the 9th day of May,
1975, as shown by the amended Certificate of Mailing (R. 113). No objection to th
Motion, no Petition for any relief seeking the opportunity for further discovery
was ever filed by Plaintiff nor were any Affidavits or other statements made controverting any of the facts or indicating the existence of a factual issue to be
decided by the Court beyond the scope of the admitted facts before it. At the
hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court after the oral argument and
the presentation of a written Brief at the hearing by Defendant, NORTH AMERICAN
LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY specifically allowed time for the filing of a response
in writing by Plaintiff, and took the Motion under advisement (R. 117). No Brief
was submitted by Plaintiff (R. 148). It should be noted that the Court waited
until the 30th day of June, 1975 before proceeding further by the entry of its
memorandum decision (R. 148, 149). After the issuance of the memorandum decision
(R. 148, 149), Respondent prepared and served Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and a Decree (R. 150, 155). No Motion for new trial or to set aside the Findings, Conclusions of Law and Judgment or other appeal for relief to the lower Court
was ever made by the Appellant in this matter (R. 148).
The multitude of authority cited by Appellant in support of the right of
discovery are needless. No one has denied to the Appellant the right of discovery,

- 8 Appellant simply did not exercise the right and it does not become the duty of
the Respondent or of the Court to conduct the discovery for the Plaintiff-Appellant.
We do not quarrel with the authorities cited by Appellant, they are simply inapplicable to the factual situation in this case as disclosed by the record.

This

matter may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Appellant did not afford
the lower Court any opportunity to rule upon or consider any claim by Appellant
that any right of discovery was being denied by that Court.

In the case of CLAASEN

vs. FARMER'S GRAIN COOPERATIVE., 208 Kansas 129,490 P.2d 376, the Court under similar
circumstances said:"Syllabus by the Court
1. A party against whom a motion for summary judgment
is sustained cannot object on appeal to the action of the
trial court in hearing and acting on the motion when the record
discloses that he introduced no evidence at the hearing on the
motion for summary judgment, did not object thereto, and did not
request time to make further discovery.11
********

"(1) Plaintiff first claims error in that the trial court
sustained the defendant's motion for summary judgment without a
, pretrial conference or without permitting plaintiff to produce
evidence refuting the testimony of defendant's witnesses. The
record does not disclose that plaintiff objected to the hearing
on the motion for summary judgment or asked for time to make
further discovery. The plaintiff cannot now object to the ruling
of the trial court. (Bicknell v. Jones, 203 Kan. 196, 453 P.2d
127.)"
We respectfully submit that Appellant's contention is without merit.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS NO ENFORCEABLE CLAIM TO
DEATH BENEFITS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, NORTH AMERICAN LIFE
AND CASUALTY COMPANY UNDER THE POLICY SURRENDERED BY THE
OWNER-INSURED PRIOR TO HIS DEATH FOR THE CASH SURRENDER
VALUE AS A NON-FORFEITABLE BENEFIT UNDER THE POLICY
Plaintiff-Appellant's claim arouses the sympathy of anyone to whom the
facts may be presented.

By a cruel quirk of fate the husband of the Plaintiff,

- 9 MARVIN E. HAYS, was called by death within three days after having exercised an
election to surrender the insurance policy on his life, of which he was the owner,
to NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY for its cash surrender value, thereby
depriving the Plaintiff as Beneficiary of death benefits otherwise payable under
the policy. The situation is sad but there is no legal basis upon which the
Defendant-Respondent, NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY can pay out the dea
benefits under the policy to this Plaintiff. For reasons best known to himself,
MARVIN E. HAYS, husband of the Plaintiff-Appellant, ELLEN HAYS, decided to give
up the policy which he had carried with NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY
since 1965 and accept the cash benefit under the policy as was his non-forfeitable
privilege. He initiated the steps in connection with this matter through FIDELITY
INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN. He went to that company and requested that thi
ascertain what the cash benefits were on this policy (R. 26, 15D). NORTH AMERICAN
LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY responded to this request for information by forwarding
to MR. HAYS, in care of RON JENSEN of FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN,
a letter dated March 21, 1972, setting forth the cash surrender value of the policj
and specifically urging that MR. HAYS consider the suggestions on the reverse side
of the form which was enclosed before proceeding with the surrender of his insurance (R. 102, 103). MR. HAYS, nevertheless concluded that he desired to have the
cash values in the policy and did execute in the presence of RON JENSEN, a form,
"Surrender of Policy for Cash Value" (R. 104) on the 24th day of March, 1972 (R. 104
R. 71, 75, Interrogatories 17, 18 and 19 and responses thereto). Having executed
the Application for the surrender of the policy for cash value, MR. HAYS, then
turned the same over to RON JENSEN of FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN
to forward the same to NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY. MR. JENSEN prompt
carried out the wishes of MR. HAYS and did forward the Application to NORTH AMERICA
LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY on March 24, 1972, by regular mail (R. 75, Interrogatory

- 10 19 and answer thereto). NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY actually received
the Application for the cash surrender value of the policy on March 27, 1972 (R. 51,
Interrogatory 16, answer sub-paragraph f and No. 17). The form was promptly processed by the company and a check in the amount of $283.13, payable to the insured,
was issued (R. 51, Interrogatory 16, sub-paragraph g, R. 112 and R. 100). The
Plaintiff-Appellant took the check and negotiated the same (R. 100). The right which
the owner-insured, MARVIN E. HAYS, exercised under the policy was a non-forfeitable
right (R. 23, policy attached thereto, non-forfeiture benefits). The exact language
of the policy is as follows:
"NON-FORFEITURE BENEFITS
Cash Surrender Value- The owner may surrender this policy
at any time for its Cash Surrender Value, which will be the Cash
Value obtained from the table of Non-forfeiture Values less any
indebtedness. Values at interim points in a policy year will be
calculated with due allowance for fractional premiums paid and
time elapsed since the last anniversary, provided, however, that
the Cash Value within 60 days of the due date of an unpaid premium shall be the same as on such due date".
The Beneficiary under the policy of insurance issued on the life of
MARVIN E. HAYS, had no rights under the policy nor is she granted any by Utah Law
with respect to the exercise of these non-forfeitable rights. The policy is specific,
"with the exception of the benefit payable at the death of the insured to the Beneficiary, the owner, subject to the rights of any assignee, shall have all right,
privileges and benefits contained in this policy" (R. 30, copy of policy attached).
There seems to be no conflict in the law with regard to the rights of the insured
under such policy. COUCH ON INSURANCE, 2d Ed., §32; 183. On the subject matter
"Exercise of Option as Acceptance of an Offer", at page 412, while recognizing that
there is some conflict in language of the cases on this subject matter and some
analyses have been made which do not give appropriate effect to the language in its
ordinary contract sense, the authority concludes;

- 11 "it is,however, generally and properly held that the
insurer has no choice in the matter but is bound by the terms
of its contract, and assuming the conditions to election have
been satisfied, cannot refuse to give the election full effect.
***The better analysis of the problem is undoubtedly to hold
that the option is the same as any other option contract, namely,
that is the insurer who stands as offeror with no freedom of
choice once the offeree-optionee, here the insured, chooses to
exercise his option. In accordance with this view, it is held
that the right or option under a life insurance policy to surrender the policy and accept its cash surrender value, constitutes a continuing offer on the part of the insurer which,
when accepted by the insured through the exercise of such right
or option, fixes the rights of the party without further action
on the part of the insurer. Similarly, it is held that an option
contained in a policy whereby the insured may surrender it for its
cash value is an offer from the insurer to the insured which it
is his right to accept in accordance with provisions of the policy
as to time, and other details, and if he does so the contract is
complete and the insurer has no right to accept or reject his
election to take the cash surrender value; that is, its obligation
is absolute, subject to such provisions as may exist as to the
time of making the payment*** As a further application of these
principles it has been held that if actual receipt of the election
is not required, there is an effective election where the notice
of the insured is mailed to the insurer, and that the mailing of
a letter electing to take the surrender value precludes recovery
for subsequent death, although the check for the amount of the
surrender value was not received until later*** Statements to the
effect that an election of a non-forfeiture clause contemplates
a meeting of minds on the matter agreed upon should not be interpreted as indicating that the insured is making an offer which must
be accepted by the insurer, for the agreement of the parties is to
be found in the fact that the insurer had made the offer of the
options one of which was then accepted by the election of the insured.
The fact that the insurer has not performed in accordance
with the option after the election of the insured has been properly
communicated to it, does not establish that the exercise of the
option is not binding upon it, but only that it has failed to perform its contract according to its terms and that it may therefore
be liable for damages for its breach.
§ 32:184. *****When the insurer has "accepted" the election
of the insured the latter may no longer revoke his election, not
because the election was an offer which the insurer could reject
but because the act of "acceptance" definitively establishes that
the acceptance by the insured of the option-offer was communicated
to the insurer and thus became binding on both parties."
In the Kansas City Missouri case of PACK vs. PROGRESSIVE LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, 187 SW 2d 501, decided in the Missouri Court of Appeals, March 5, 1945,

- 12 while the factual situation is not parallel to the instant case and involves many
complicated factors which are irrelevant to consideration here, it remains that the
insured in that case elected to take the cash value out of the policies which he
had with the Defendant company, the company defended against a claim for the death
benefits, and the Court concluded:
"The privilege exercised, the option of surrendering
the policies for their cash value was won, bought and paid
for by the insured; such option is an offer contained in the
policy contract and is from the company to the insured, and
it is his right to accept the offer, within a specified time,
and his acceptance completes the contract; the company has no
right to accept or reject; its obligation to pay is absolute.
In this case the only limitation is that, as the policy provided, the insurance company may defer such payment for a
period not exceeding six months but that cannot effect fixed
liability.'1
It should be noted that in this case 0. E. Pack, the insured, died on June 17, 1936.
Up to that date, the company had still not paid the amount of the cash value of the
policies though it had recognized in writing its obligation to do so but insisted
that it had the right under the policy to defer the payment for six months and then
it failed to act. Mr. Pack having died, the Beneficiary brought suit seeking to
recover the full amount due under the policies rather than the cash surrender value.
The Court held that having exercised the right that the liabilities became fixed
and the death of Mr. Pack did not change this or give the Beneficiary any increased
rights, and the Court held:
"we conclude that the admitted and undisputed evidence
compels but one conclusion, and that is, that the insured
definitely elected to take the cash surrender value of the
policies at a time when he had a right to make such an election,
and that such an election made a binding contract between the
insured and the defendant. The fact that the defendant did not
pay the cash value in accordance with the policies may be morally
reprehensible, but in law it is a breach of contract. It is
unnecessary to discuss the other questions raised."
In the instant case the company promptly paid the cash values of the policy which
were accepted by Plaintiff (R. 112, 100). The Plaintiff admits that the insured did
not at any time take any action to reverse the action which he had taken of submitting

• 13 the policy to the company for the cash surrender value (R, 89, Demand for Admissioi
No. 5 and response thereto).

In the case of PACIFIC STATES LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

vs. BRYCE, decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuitf 67 Fed.
2d 710, the facts were that the policy was issued upon the life of Charles W. Bryc<
who died March 28, 1932. The Plaintiff in that action was his widow and Beneficial
of the insurance policy. The policy provided"
"all the rights and benefits accruing hereunder to the
insured are vested in said insured without consent of any Beneficiary unless otherwise provided by the insured or expressly
prohibited by statute".
On January 18, 1932, the insured mailed the policy to the company with a statement
that he would like to cash it in on February 3rd, the next premium date. On Januai
29th, the company called his attention to the fact that if the cash were withdrawn
his insurance would be gone and suggested that he borrow on the policy instead.
On February 3rd, the insured expressed his appreciation of the interest shown by
the company, but adhered to his decision to cash in the policy. The company then
mailed to him on February 9th,the form of agreement which recites,
"the sole owners of policy No. 8549*** have this day
surrendered said policy in consideration of its cash value
which at this time amounts to $585.00, and said parties hereby
acknowledge receipt of $585.00 in consideration of which the
agreed or released said Pacific States Life Insurance for all
further liabilities under policy No. 8549. This agreement was
executed by the insured and also the Plaintiff (the beneficiary
under the policy) although she was neither an assignee nor an
irrevocably named beneficiary. On February 24th the company
acknowledged receipt of the surrender agreement and advised
by reason of conjestion in its loan department some delay would
ensue in remitting the cash, but the check would go forward as
soon as the application was reached in its turn. The insured took
no further steps in the matter. After his death on March 28th,
the company mailed a check for the surrender value on April 8th,
which the parties stipulate was as soon as cash was available
therefore and in its proper turn, and the policy was endorsed,
cash surrender, April 8, 1932. Demand was made for payment of
the face amount of the policy and refused and the suit therefore followed.***"
The Court held,
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the delay occasioned by the deluge of applications for surrender values. Nor are we presented with the question of
whether a rescission could be had after the death of the
insured had radically changed the situation as it existed
when the contract was made. If there ever was a right to
rescind the contract by which the insured became entitled to
the surrender value, it was not one which could be exercised
by the beneficiary of the surrendered policy. Upon the death
of the insured there passed to his estate a claim of $435.00
against the insurance company. His personal representative,
his heirs, his creditors cannot be deprived of this chose
in action by one who was the beneficiary in a surrendered
life insurance policy. If the administrator of his estate
sued for the $435.00, the company could not defend upon the
ground that the beneficiary elected that it should not pay it.
Whatever may be the true rule as to the right of a beneficiary
to exercise an option afforded by an insurance contract which
the insured had not exercised in his lifetime, certainly one
who once was a beneficiary in a surrendered insurance policy
has no right to rescind a contract by which the insured converted an agreement to pay a larger sum upon death into an
agreement to pay a smaller sum now.***"

*

The Supreme Court of Utah has previously considered a parallel case in the case of
DECKER vs. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, decided February 21, 1938, 94 Utah 166;
76 P.2d 568. The case was twice before this Court.

In the initial instance the

Court considered the matter upon appeal from a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.
The judgment was in the amount of $3,220.00 in favor of Plaintiff who was awarded
judgment for the proceeds of a policy upon the life of her deceased husband, Feramorz
Decker. The facts were that Feramorz Decker, husband of the Plaintiff, had taken
out a policy of life insurance with the Defendant for $5,000.00 executed on June
7, 1922. His wife was named Beneficiary. Decker failed to pay the quarterly premium
due September 1, 1935 and on October 26, 1935, he delivered the policy to and requested
the Defendant insurance company to pay to him the cash surrender value. The cash
surrender value as of September 1, 1935, was $660.00, but there was an indebtedness
of $407.48 against the policy. Decker died on November 3, 1935, eight days after
delivery of the policy and before the Defendant had paid to Decker the net surrender
value of $252.52. The facts as thus set forth were admitted by the pleadings. The
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of the policy remitting any allowance over the amount of $3,000.00 in order to
keep the matter in State Court. The Plaintiff claimed that the insurance was in
full force as of the date of the death of the insured subject only to the amount
of the loans. There was no dispute that the policy provisions provided that after
three full years of premiums having been paid, the insured at the end of any insurance year or within three months after any default in payment of a premium but not
later, might surrender the policy and receive its cash surrender value. The Plaintiff advanced many theories in support of her contention, each of which was careful'
considered and disposed of by the Court. Some of the points considered have no
relevance because of the different factual situation but on the point which is prec
parallel

to this case the reasoning of the Court as outlined in the DECKER decisior

is quoted as follows:
"It will be noted from the policy that the option to
surrender and receive the cash surrender value is one which
can be exercised irrespective of the assent of the insurance
company. It is not governed by the rule of sale which holds
that where goods are sold for cash title will not be considered
as having passed until the cash is paid. While the policy
states that the 'Insured may * * * surrender the policy, and
(1) Receive its cash surrender value,1 it does not say that he
should receive it contemporaneously. It is difficult to see
how the company could write several alternatives for the surrender of the policy without putting in the words, 'Receive
its cash surrender value.1 Respondent contends that if delivery
of the policy and the reception of cash were not to be simultaneous but the company was to have time after delivery of the
policy to pay the surrender value, it should have so stipulated.
Perhaps the insured might have insisted on a contemporaneous
transaction, but the fact is that he did not do so. He sent
the policy in with a request for the net due to him from his
reserve. This was an unequivocal election to terminate the
policy and accept its cash surrender value less his indebtedness. Only eight days passed between this act and his death,
not an unreasonable time in which to put the policy through the
processes of audit and to return the cash. But if it were
contemplated that the insured might demand payment of the surrender value contemporaneous with the delivery of the policy,
he did not require it. He made his election. It is unfortunate that he did so in view of his unexpected demise so soon
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gave up his policy, made his election to take the cash surrender value, and the company could do nothing else than to
send it to him or his personal representative. It had no
choice. He or his representative could enforce the duty by
suit. Whether the election might be recalled for failure to
pay or tender within a reasonable time is not involved in this
suit.
In the case of Pacific States Life Ins. Co. v. Bryce,
67 F.2d 710, 711, 91 A.L.R. 1446, written by Judge McDermott
of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the facts were substantially as in the case at bar. They appear from the quoted
portion of that decision. The court said:
'The pleadings tender the simple issue as to whether the
policy was effectively surrendered prior to the death of the
insured. The facts are stipulated. A net reserve of $435.00
had accumulated on this policy by February 3, 1932, the premium
paying date. The policy accorded the insured three elections
as to this reserve: It could (1) be withdrawn in cash, or (2)
used to purchse a paid-up policy for a reduced amount, or (3)
used to purchase extended insurance for the face of the policy
for a limited term. In the absence of such election, feature
(3) became automatic. * * *. .
'On January 18 (1933) the insured mailed the policy to the
company with the statement that he would like to cash it in on
February 3 (1933), the next premium date. * * * The company then
mailed him, on February 9, a form of agreement which recites that
the 'sole owners of Policy No. 8549 * * * have this day surrendered
said Policy in consideration of its cash value, which at this time
amounts to Five Hundred Eighty-five and no/100 Dollars.1 * * *
'This agreement was executed by the insured and also the
plaintiff, although she was neither an assignee nor an irrevocably
named beneficiary. On February 24, the company acknowledged receipt
of the surrender agreement and advised that by reason of the congestion in its Loan Department, some delay would ensue in remitting
the cash, but that check would go forward as soon as the application
was reached in its turn.
'The insured took no further steps in the matter. After his
death on March 28, the company mailed a check for the surrender
value on April 8. * * * Demand was made for the payment of the face
of the policy, refused, and this suit followed. * * *
'Plaintiff's theory, adopted by the trial court, is that the
execution of the surrender agreement was an offer by the insured to
the company to surrender the policy for a cash payment of $435.00;
that such offer lapsed and the surrender agreement voided because
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before the death of the insured.
'With this construction of the policy contract we are
not in accord. It puts the cart before the horse. The policy
vested in the insured certain definite rights, among them the
right to be paid the reserve on his policy in cash upon a surrender of his policy, if demanded within a specified time. The
insured did demand the surrender value within the prescribed
time, and surrendered his policy. When he did so-a month before
his death-he became absolutely entitled to payment in cash of
$435.00. Upon his death his estate, and not his beneficiary
became entitled to that sum. The offer is contained in the
policy contract, and is from the company to the insured; the
option is in the insured and not the company, and his acceptance
completes the contract; the company has no right to accept or
reject; its obligation to pay is absolute. Under plaintiff's
theory, an insured may only offer to surrender his policy for
its cash value; the company may then accept or reject the offer,
and if it fails to pay as agreed, the offer lapses. Such a
construction would wipe out the right of an insured to the cash
surrender value of his policy, because the company could defeat
his right by rejecting his offer, or by failing to pay. To construe an exercise of an option as an offer to the company, subject to rejection or lapse, would be to warp the plain terms of
the contract and to deny the insured a right he has paid for.
If Bryce, on March 15, had sued the company for $435.00, could
the company have defended on the ground that it had not accepted
his offer to take the cash surrender value? Clearly not; yet
plaintiff's contention comes down to that.'
Respondent both criticizes this case and attempts to distinguish it from the one at bar. The criticism is hurled at the
ground for the decision mentioned in the Bryce Case, i.e., that
there was a continuous irrevocable offer on the part of the insurer
to pay the cash surrender value upon delivery of the policy, and
that insured's acceptance completed the contract. We have no disposition to battle for this conception. It seems sufficient to us
to hold that by the contract the insured had a right to elect to
surrender the policy and receive the net surrender value and that
the transactions of delivery or surrender and reception of the money
were not required to be contemporaneous, at least if he did not
insist upon it. We think the Bryce Case correctly decided on
the principle that the surrender by the insured was complete when he
delivered the policy to the insurance company with request for payment of its cash surrender value."
Since the case on its original hearing before the Court had come there on demurer,
and since the pleadings had raised issues of fact not fully decided, the Court reti
the case for further action.

It was again presented on further appeal after the
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situation with regard to the surrender of the policy was discussed at length but
the provisions and the discussion are not particularly helpful to the decision in
this case because the policy was delivered to the office of the insurance company by
putting the same through a mail slot in the door, no one was present, the policy
was found by someone who entered the building, the question was whether there was
fraud involved in connection with the transaction. After having considered the
various factual elements the Court reiterated its opinion at Page 693 of the Pacific
Report,
"the exercise of either of the options become effective
from the time exercised. No meeting of minds is required to
entitle the insured to the option selected by him. The election
to take the cash surrendered value was one over which the insurer
had no control. The request for the cash surrender value was made
and was not recalled.***
There was no substantial evidence when considered with
the pleadings upon which the jury could have found for the
plaintiff. Under the allegations and proof, all reasonable men
would conclude that the insured had signed and sent on its way
the cash surrender request and that during the lifetime of the
insured it had not been recalled. Under such circumstances, a
directed verdict for the defendant was proper.***"
In a \/ery recent annotation on this subject appearing in 15 ALR 3rd at
page 1317, the annotating authority discusses,
"Insured's Exercise of Election Afforded Under Life Insurance Policy as Affected By His Death Before Complete Consumation
of Option."
The annotating authority says, Page 1319, Sec. 1. Introduction,
"This annotation collects the cases which are concerned
with the question whether an insuredfs death prevents his partially consummated election afforded under a life insurance
policy from being legally effective. ***
II.
Sec. 3.

GENERAL RULES

Continuing-offer rule

(page 1321)

Ample authority supports the fundamental rule that an
option contained in a l i f e insurance policy is a continuing
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accepted by the insured, the subsequent death of the insured
being irrelevant to the effectiveness of the election." (Citing
many cases including Pacific States Life Ins. Co. v. Bryce supra and Decker v. New York Life Ins. Co. supra.) (Emphasis ours)
The authorities cited by the Plaintiff-Appellant to the effect that the
Beneficiary has a vested interest in the policy and that the policy could not be
surrendered without the consent of the Beneficiary are not pertinent inasmuch as th<
contract provisions made it clear in the instant case that the insured enjoyed all
rights under the policy.
There is no statutory provision in this state which requires the consent
of the Beneficiary to the taking of any action which the insured reserves to himsel
under the policy.

The legislature of the State of Utah has not been silent upon th

matter of non-forfeitable rights under an insurance policy and has enacted 31-22-13
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended by Laws of Utah 1963, Chapter 45, Section 2, an
Laws of Utah 1973, Chapter 49, Section 7, wherein the provisions of a policy with
regard to non-forfeitable rights are statutorily commanded.

But in so doing, the

Legislature has not made any provision which requires that a Beneficiary be consult
in the exercise by the insured of these non-forfeitable rights.

It should be noted

that MRS. HAYS was aware her husband had surrendered the policy on the day that he
did so (R. 100). Nothing was done by her or her husband in regard to the matter
until after his unexpected death three days later (R. 100). The law is clearthat
MARVIN E. HAYS, having exercisedhis non-forfeitable right under the policy of insur
ance to the cash surrender value of the policy which action he did not rescind duri
his lifetime had effectually determined the amount to be paid under the policy.

Th

amount was paid and the Plaintiff has had the benefit thereof by her own admission
(R. 100).
The relationship between NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, if any
with FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF 0GDEN, is immaterial to the decision of
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which was taken by FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN. Neither FIDELITY
INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN nor anyone else could act to annul the action
of the insured in exercising his prerogative to accept the cash benefits under the
policy. Consequently the question of whether FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF
OGDEN did or did not call the insurance company to advise them of the death of MR.
HAYS has no bearing on the Court's decision. The insured had acted, he did not
retract the action during his lifetime. Any default by FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT
:0MPANY OF OGDEN in carrying out MRS. HAYS' instruction to notify the insurance
:arrier of the death of MR. HAYS can have no affect upon the outcome of the case if,
n fact, such a default took place. The question of whether or not the policy was
fritten through FIDELITY INDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN or whether it was the
roper agency to pay premiums to and other miscellaneous issues implied or suggested
y the Plaintiff's Complaint and Interrogatories are equally immaterial, for under
he factual situation here admitted, nothing hinges upon the performance of FIDELITY
VDUSTRIAL CREDIT COMPANY OF OGDEN or its relationship to NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND
\SUALTY COMPANY.
CONCLUSION
The Judgment should be affirmed.
rt>
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